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Abstract 
This thesis analyzes the effect of piracy on the price of eBook when the publisher uses the 
market platform for the sale of eBook. Under the traditional sales mechanism, called “resale 
model”, the market platform or an intermediary purchases eBook from the publisher at a 
wholesale price and sets the retail price. Under the new sales mechanism, called “agency 
model”, the publisher sets the retail price directly and pays a share of revenue to the platform 
as a fee for its service. Using a theoretical model, this thesis compares the equilibrium 
outcomes under both sales mechanisms. It shows that the retail price is always higher in the 
resale model regardless of the presence of piracy due to the presence of double 
marginalization associated with the resale model.  In the presence of piracy, the size of the 
price increase is higher under the agency model due to investment in Digital Right 
Management (DRM) by the publishers. Under the agency model, publisher can recoup DRM 
cost only by setting higher retail price. However, under the resale model, platform recovers 
DRM cost in two ways: paying lower wholesale price and charging on retail price. Therefore, 
the demand for an original eBook reduces more with piracy under the agency model than 
under the resale model. The equilibrium amount of investment for DRM is the same under 
the both models, because consumer’s piracy behavior does not relate to the pricing model 
adopted by the industry.  The amount of profits for publisher and marketplace vary according 
to pre-specified share of revenue. This thesis suggests that, in the presence of piracy, the 
agency model may not be a better strategy for the publisher if the market structure is 
monopoly; the resale model may be better for the publisher in this situation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This is an age of digitalization. Today 2.7 billion people use the Internet worldwide and more 
than $2 trillion is spent on information technologies and services annually (The Software 
Alliance, 2014).  Digital products, which can be converted into digital format and transferred 
through computers and other devices, have gained increasing importance in music, movie 
and book industries (OECD 2012). The book industry is undergoing a digital transformation 
enabled by the development of the Internet and information communication technologies; 
and the industry increasingly sells digital books to consumer as a form of file in online 
marketplaces instead of selling the traditional form of paper books (Jiang & Katsamakas, 
2010). The size of the global book industry ($151bn) is larger than music ($50bn), video 
games ($63bn), magazines ($107bn) and even the movie and entertainment ($133bn) 
industries (Global eBook Report, Spring-2014). At present, the U.S. is the market leader of 
eBooks consumption. The U.S. eBook market has grown rapidly and it now constitutes $3 
billion revenue out of the total $15 billion book industry (2012) and its market size is 
expected to increase to $8.2 billion by 2017 (PwC, 2013). Although the availability of the 
Internet and digital devices accelerate the demand for eBooks, it also fuels digital piracy. 
Digital pirates can easily copy digital products such as software, movie, music, and eBook 
without reducing the product quality. Loss from piracy is huge. For instance, the commercial 
value of unlicensed PC software installation totaled $62.7 billion globally in 2013 (The 
Software Alliance, 2014).  The U.S. movie industry was argued to have lost $6.1 billion in 
2005 due to piracy (McBride & Fowler, 2006). Global piracy of music causes $12.5 billion 
economic losses in 2009 (Vernik et al. 2011). A recent study shows that nearly 3 million 
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people daily search for unauthorized downloads of the top 90 books on Amazon, leading to 
revenue losses from piracy of approximately $3 billion annually (Digimark, 2014). 
Traditional sales mechanism of most products can be described as a resale model in 
which an intermediary (such as Sears and Home Depot) purchases products from suppliers 
and then sells them to consumers (Hagiu, 2007). Since late 2000s, an alternative mechanism, 
called an agency model, started to become popular in which an intermediary (such as 
Amazon, eBay, and Apple’s iTune) operates as a marketplace where suppliers directly sell 
products to consumers. Although it is possible to sell digital product directly from seller to 
consumer through dedicated website, the demand for platform marketplace as an 
intermediary of digital products is growing. Gans (2013) noted two possible reasons of this 
changing behavior of the sellers; first, platform mitigates the transaction cost of consumers 
by providing security and other benefits, and second, most of the platforms have their own 
devices (e.g., Amazon has Kindle and Apple has iPad), which help consumers to purchase a 
product very easily, usually through one touch on related ‘apps’. Other reasons may include 
large fixed cost and diversity of related products that are available on marketplace.  If a seller 
wants to set up his own website instead of platform for selling directly to the consumer, (s)he 
has to incur large fixed cost. Platform also provides a variety of products that helps 
consumers compare among various products from different competing sellers. Apple started 
to use the agency model in 2010 for selling eBook through its iPad. Before the entry of 
Apple, Amazon was the only significant player in the eBook market as a reseller and it sells 
eBook through its dedicated eBook reader, Kindle. Publishers claimed that Amazon was 
setting the retail price below the wholesale price which hampered the sales of printed books. 
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Publishers supported the agency model adopted by Apple and forced Amazon to apply the 
agency model because it enables them to set the retail price, and Amazon eventually adopted 
the agency model. Today, the agency model approach is commonly used by companies that 
support marketplaces for applications (“apps") used on mobile devices, and the key 
intermediaries in the e-book market (Gans, 2012; Johnson, 2013a , 2013b; Abhishek et al. 
2013; Foros et al., 2013; and  Hagui & Wright, 2013). A fundamental difference between the 
two models is the allocation of control rights (such as prices, advertising, customer service, 
etc.) between suppliers and intermediaries (Haigu & Wright, 2013). For example, under the 
agency model the retail prices are set by publishers who directly sell to consumers, whereas 
in resale model they are set by an intermediary (Abhishek, 2013). Following the adoption of 
the agency model in 2010 by Apple and Amazon, it was reported that the prices of many e-
books have significantly increased, leading to global antitrust scrutiny (Carr, 2012; Global 
eBook Report, 2013). Several studies (Gans, 2012; Johnson, 2013a , 2013b; Abhishek et al., 
2013; Foros et al., 2013; Hagui & Wright, 2013) analyzed the differences in retail prices 
under both approaches. However, those studies do not consider the effects of piracy that 
could be one of the biggest challenges in the growth of the e-book industry (The Economist, 
September 10, 2011). 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the effects of piracy on retail prices under the 
agency and resale models, respectively. To fulfill our objective, first, we consider a 
benchmark case and show how price differs under the agency and resale models. Then, we 
consider piracy case and show how equilibrium price differs under the both models. Finally, 
we compare benchmark and piracy scenarios of the both models. 
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We find that in the benchmark case without piracy, the retail price is higher under the 
resale model. In resale model, platform sets retail price and publisher sets wholesale price. 
Platform pays wholesale price to the publisher for each eBook. The platform exercises the 
mark-up of the retail price on the basis of the wholesale price. Therefore, in resale model, 
price set-up is a two steps process, which leads to higher price than price in agency model, 
where publisher sets retail price and no additional mark-up on retail price by the platform. 
In the presence of piracy, the size of price increase is higher in agency model. If the 
investment in DRM increases, after a certain level, price will be same under the both models, 
because under the agency model, only publisher bears the DRM cost. Publisher, then, 
recovers this cost by charging higher price on consumer. Under the resale model, platform 
invests in DRM to protect piracy. Platform recovers DRM cost in two ways: (i) Paying lower 
wholesale price to the publisher; the publisher may set lower wholesale price in the presence 
of DRM believing that DRM will create more demand, and (ii) incorporating portion of 
DRM cost in retail price. Therefore, demand for original eBook reduces at a higher rate with 
the increasing amount of DRM investment under the agency model than that of resale model. 
We find that cost of DRM is same under the both models, because consumer’s piracy 
behavior does not relate to the pricing model adopted by the industry.  We find that 
wholesale price reduces in the presence of DRM investment, because with higher piracy 
protection, publisher charges lower wholesale price under the resale model.  
The comparison between the benchmark and piracy scenarios illustrates that the price 
is higher in the presence of piracy due to the investment in DRM. We find that the retail price 
is higher under the resale model in the both scenarios due to the double marginalization 
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problem (Gans, 2013). However, further investment in piracy protection will increase the 
retail price under the agency model, because only publisher bears the DRM cost. Publisher, 
then, recovers this cost by charging higher price on consumer. As we mentioned earlier, 
under the resale model, platform recovers this cost in two ways: paying lower wholesale 
price to the publisher and charging more on consumers.  In the benchmark scenario, demand 
for original product is higher under the agency model due to the lower price than that of 
resale model. However, in the presence of piracy, demand for original product reduces with 
the higher rate of price increase due to increasing investment on DRM under the agency 
model than the demand under resale model. Wholesale price is higher in the benchmark case; 
however, it is lower in the piracy case due to the DRM investment by the platform. To 
recoup part of the cost, platform pays relatively lower wholesale price to the publisher. We 
find that investment in DRM is same in both models, because consumer behaves in the same 
way under whatever model employed by the industry. Finally, we show that piracy affects 
aversely on the profits of publisher and platform.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we describe market 
structure of eBook. In chapter three, we incorporate literature review. In chapter four, we 
specify the model. In chapter five, we discuss the effects of piracy. Finally, in chapter six, we 
conclude and discuss possible extensions of our model. 
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Chapter 2: Market Structure of the eBook Industry 
An e-book is defined as a book-length publication, consisting of text (and, sometimes, 
images) in digital form formatted to be read on the electronic screens of user devices such as 
e-readers, computers and mobile phones (OECD, 2012). Michael Hart, founder of Project 
Gutenberg, introduced e-books in 1971. Project Gutenberg is a volunteer effort to encourage 
the creation and distribution of e-books. Although eBook first launch in 1971, its 
proliferation was spurred by the introduction of Sony’s e-reader in 2006, Amazon’s Kindle in 
2007, and Barnes & Noble’s Nook in 2009. Furthermore, Apple’s iPad, which was released 
in 2010, creates wide scale ground for e-book market. To take a position in the tablet market, 
Amazon introduced Kindle Fire in 2011.  The percentage of Americans who read eBook is 
growing from 17% in 2012 to 28% in 2014 (See Figure 2-1). E-book has the potential to 
fundamentally change the way that books and other publications are consumed, as well as the 
business and legal structure that surround them (OECD, 2012).  
Figure 2-1Growing Percentages of eReading 
 
Source: PewResaerchCentre, 2014 
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An eBook offers many distinctive benefits over printed book. One can easily 
purchase, download, and read eBook without going to traditional bookstore. In an eBook 
device, one can store thousands of eBooks, easily change font size of text, enjoy related 
visual image and sound, and use text-to-speech if required. One can use computer or ‘cloud’ 
to create back up for an eBook. Production of eBook does not require paper and ink. 
Marketers can easily distribute eBooks through the web with lowest possible cost. Figure 2-2 
shows some areas where eBooks serve well than printed books. 
Figure 2-2 Percentages of Consumers’ Preferences Based on Purpose: Printed book vs. eBook  
 
Source: PewResearchCentre, 2012 
2.1 eBook Market 
The United States is the market leader of eBooks consumption at present. According to AAP 
BookStats (2013), eBooks has grown 45% since 2011 and now constitute 20% of the ‘trade 
market’, trade market is a book industry term, which means market for general readership. 
PwC (2013) predicts the U.S. eBook market will outstrip the printed book market in 2017. It 
estimates that trade eBooks, books produced for general readership, will reach $8.28 billion 
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in sales by 2017 to surpass printed trade book sales, which are expected to fall from $11.84 
billion in 2012 to $7.72 billion in 2017 (See Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1 The U.S. Trend of eBook Sales and Its Projection (values in billions of USD) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Print & Audio Books 15.96 15 14.12 13.04 11.84 10.86 9.76 8.96 8.32 7.72 
eBook 0.2 0.8 1.56 2.32 3.4 4.64 5.72 6.8 7.48 8.28 
Source: PwC 2013 
 
The market Share of e-Books is increasing throughout the world. At present, the 
United States (21% of all trade books) and the United Kingdom (25% of all trade books) 
dominate the e-book market (Global eBook Report, Spring-2014). Within 2-3 years China 
and India appear as the significant e-book market in the world, because they have huge 
demand for books due to large population, growing economy, and widely available mobile 
Internet infrastructure (Global eBook Report, Spring-2014). 
Table 2-2 Market Shares of eBooks in Selected Markets 
Country eBooks Titles Available 
from Publishers 
% of eBook in Total 
market 
% of eBook in Trade 
Market 
United States 1,700,000 13% 21% 
United Kingdom 1,750,000 11.5% 25% 
Germany 91,110 5% 10.6% 
France 126,000 1.1% 3% 
Spain 30,000-50,000 3 to 5% 8% 
Italy 71,243 - 4 to 5% 
Sweden 4800 1% 1% 
Denmark 13,000 - 1% -2% 
Norway 3,500 -  
Netherlands 30,000 4 to 7% 10% 
Russia 80,000-100,000 -    1% 
Brazil 25,000 - 2.5% 
China 11,154 - - 
India - -     but, 20-25% 
within 2-3 yeras 
Source: Compiled from Wischenbart’s Global eBook- a report on market trends and 
developments, Spring- 2014  
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2.2 Software 
There are many e-book formats available in the market. However, PDF, EPUB, AZW, and 
HTML are widely used by device manufacturers (OECD, 2012). Adobe System introduced 
PDF in 1993 to allow users to exchange and view electronic documents independent of the 
environment in which they were created or the environment in which they are viewed. PDF 
was released as open standard on July, 2008. PDF helps to make and distribute eBooks 
easily. Open eBook Forum introduced EPUB as open eBook formatting standard on 
September, 1999. At present, EPUB is the open standard for digital publications set by the 
International Digital Publishing Forum. Most devices such as Kobo e-reader, various iOS 
devices, Barnes and Noble’s Nook, Sony Reader, various Android based devices use EPUB 
format. Amazon introduced AZW format for its Kindle eBook reader. AZW is based on 
Mobipocket standard, with a unique serial number scheme and its own DRM formatting. 
To protect e-books from illegal copying, printing, and sharing, most of the publishers 
and retailers use digital right management (DRM) software. DRM includes provisions such 
as limit to make personal copies, lend copies to others, service discontinuation, technological 
upgrading etc.  However, DRM is not universally acceptable software. Some e-book 
providers think DRM helps to fight online copyright infringement. However, others say 
DRM creates inconvenience for legal consumers and hinders innovation. Details of DRM 
will be discussed in literature review section. 
2.3 Hardware 
E-books can be read in e-book readers, computers, tablets, and smartphones. However, e-
reader and tablet contribute to the significant development of the e-book market.  E-reader is 
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an electronic device designed to access, store, and read digital publications. The special 
feature of e-book is the use of “e-ink” and “e-paper” technology, which replace LED lighting 
that causes eye fatigue. “e-ink” and “e-paper” technologies eliminate the problem created by 
LED lighting and help to read a book for long time.  
Introduction of tablets further stimulate the demand of e-book worldwide. Apple’s 
iPad, which was released in 2010, creates wide scope for e-book market. EPUB, PDF, and 
HTML formats are available in Apple’s iPad. It even has an app to access Amazon’s Kindle 
books. Amazon introduced its first tablet known as Kindle Fire in September, 2011. In 2013, 
Book Industry Study Group (BISG) and Bowker Market Research conducted a survey on 
‘Consumer Attitudes toward E-Book Reading’. The result of this study shows that tablets 
have become consumers’ preferred e-Reading devices, overtaking dedicated e-Readers (See 
Figure 2-3).  
Figure 2-3 Percentages of Users Prefer Tablet for eReading 
 
Source: Bowker Market Research, 2013 
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A survey conducted by Pew Research in January 2014 shows that overall 50% of 
American adults now have either a tablet or an e-reader for reading e-content. The survey 
also found that 92% of adults have cellphones and 75% have a desktop computer or laptop. A 
survey conducted by Book Industry Study Group (BISG) in August 2013 shows that nearly 
40% of U.S. adults who have said they read e-books own a Kindle-reader compared with 
about 27% who own an iPad (See Figure 2-4). 
Figure 2-4 Percentages of Current Device Ownership and Purchase Intent, August 2013 
 
Source: Book Industry Study Group (BISG) in August 2013  
 
            The above discussion shows that eBook market is expanding throughout the world. 
Therefore, researchers and policy makers should work on to deal with various emerging 
issues related to this market.  
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
Our work is related to three streams of literature: a two-sided market, agency vs. resale 
models, and digital piracy & Digital Right Management (DRM). We review each of these 
streams and show how our research differs from existing literatures.  
3.1 Two-Sided Market 
In general, a two-sided market can be defined as a market which involves one or more 
platforms that enables interaction between consumers and sellers by charging both parties 
(Rochet & Tirole, 2006). The examples of two-sided market include academic journals 
(Wright, 2004), heterosexual dating agencies (Armstrong, 2006), video game systems 
(Rochet & Tirole, 2006), newspapers (Eisenmann et al. 2006), credit cards (Rysman, 2009) 
etc. In two-sided market, the decision of one group depends on the decision of another group 
usually through a network externality (Armstrong, 2006; Eisenmann et al. 2006; Evans & 
Schmalensee, 2007; McCabe & Snyder, 2007; Rysman, 2009).  The price structure in two-
sided markets depends heavily on the size of indirect network externalities between user 
groups (Caillaud & Julllien, 2003; Evans, 2003; Roson, 2005; Armstrong, 2006; Rochet & 
Tirole, 2003, 2006; Hagiu, 2006, 2009).  
The eBooks are usually sold through a marketplace or a platform such as Amazon or 
Apple’s iBook store. Platform attracts publishers on one side and consumers on other side. 
The publishers’ decision to join a platform usually depends on the number of consumers in 
the platform and vice versa. Most of the platform- providers have their own devices to sell 
digital contents. Examples of devices include Amazon’s Kindle, Apple’s iPad, Sony Reader, 
  13 
Barnes & Noble’s Nook, Kobo eReader etc. Sometime prices of the digital devices depend 
on the prices of the contents and vice versa. Yu et al. (2011) find that content price plays a 
significant role in affecting the price of the digital device. However, in this paper we do not 
consider impact of digital devices on price.  
3.2 Agency and Resale Models 
There are two alternative pricing models usually adopted by platforms: (i) resale model, 
sometimes known as wholesale model (Johnson, 2013), resale agreement (Abhishek et al, 
2013), reseller mode (Hagiu & Wright, 2013). or merchant mode (Hagiu, 2007) and (ii) 
agency model. Between these two, the agency model is widely used now-a-days (Jiang et al. 
2011; Kwark et al. 2012; Abhishek et al. 2013 and Johnson, 2013a). The main difference 
between these two models is who sets the retail price (Abhishek et al. 2013). In the agency 
model, the pricing decision comes from the authors or content providers, whereas in the 
wholesale model, the retail price is set by the platform marketplace (Gans, 2012; Johnson, 
2013a & 2013b; Abhishek et al. (2013); Foros et al., 2013; and Hagui & Wright, 2013).  
The comparison between resale model vs. agency model for market intermediation is 
first introduced by Hagiu (2007). He shows that trade-off between the two models is affected 
by several economic factors such as degree of complementarity, seller’s investment 
incentive, asymmetric information etc. Only a few papers have been published so far on 
agency vs. wholesale model of pricing for digital goods in two-sided market condition. The 
authors of those papers have been motivated by recent debate on Apple’s use of agency 
model (Carr, 2012; Global eBook Report, 2014). The notable papers on agency vs. wholesale 
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models include Gans (2012), Abhishek et al. (2012), Johnson (2013a, 2013b), Hagiu & 
Wright (2013), and Foros et al. (2013). All these papers are very close to our work. 
Gans (2012) considers pricing under the direct access model, agency model and 
wholesale model. He shows that under direct access model platform plays no role and, 
therefore, transaction cost plays important role in retail price. He shows that price is higher 
under resale model than agency model due to double marginalization problem. Gans also 
identifies a hold-up problem, which arises when consumers invest in platform before the app 
providers set prices. He argues that Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause may solve hold up 
problem by imposing a price cap on the app. MFN clauses ensure that price of a digital 
content in a particular platform is not more expensive than equivalent digital offering by 
publishers elsewhere. 
Abhishek et al. (2012) focus on timing decision of using agency model instead of 
using the more conventional reselling model. They focus on the effect of competition among 
platform marketplaces and reaction of the sellers due to the impact of platforms on the sales 
in traditional channels. They show that if the platform has a negative cross-effect on demand 
in the traditional channel, the platform adopt agency selling model. But, if the channel has 
positive cross-effect on demand in the traditional channel, the platform prefers to adopt 
reselling model. They show that platforms prefer agency model when intensity of 
competition among them increases. They also show that agency model ensures lower price 
for consumers than reselling model. However, in our model, we do not consider competition, 
but we consider impact of piracy on platform and publisher. 
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Johnson (2013a) focuses on how competition among platforms such as Amazon, 
Apple, and eBay differs when the agency model is used instead of resale model. He shows 
that agency model lowers retail price if retailers compete for revenue share. His paper also 
examines the effects of most-favored nation (MFN) clauses on agency model vs. wholesale 
model. MFN clauses help raise industry profits, because under the contractual provisions of 
MFN each supplier charges the same retail price. He shows that MFN contracts under the 
agency model kill retail competition and, therefore, ensure higher price. He also shows that 
MFNs have no effect under the wholesale model, because suppliers have no incentive to 
charge different prices to different retailers. 
In his another paper, Johnson (2013b) investigates the effect of the agency model on 
pricing when there is consumer lock-in in a two-period model. He explains why price 
increases just after adoption of agency model. He shows that agency model eliminates the 
ability of retailers to act on their strategic decisions to cut price in early periods, and hence, 
raises early prices. He also shows that the agency model ensures tough competition directly 
between suppliers in later periods thereby lowering future price, because agency model 
ensures that retail competition transfers from monopoly retailer to many suppliers. Due to 
consumer lock-in, retailers become monopolists in the second period and charge higher 
prices. However, in agency model, retailers have no role on price setting, price competition 
remains in suppliers and causes lower retail price.  
Hagiu & Wright (2013) offer a guide to how intermediaries should optimally position 
themselves between the agency and resale models. They examine whether control rights over 
a non-contractible decision variable are better held by agency model or resale model. They 
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show that the agency model is preferred to the resale model whenever local information held 
by supplier is more important than the local information held be the reseller. 
By comparing agency model and resale model, Foros et al. (2013) find that retail 
price will be higher in equilibrium under the agency model if competitive pressures are lower 
upstream. Therefore, when the platform wants to induce higher price, it allows upstream 
firms to set retail price by adopting agency model. They also show that equilibrium revenue 
shares depend on competition at both levels, and upstream firms earn positive surplus even 
when platform providers have all the bargaining power. They also show that under 
asymmetric adoption of business formats, retail MFN clauses may lead to higher equilibrium 
retail prices. 
However, all the papers discussed above do not consider the effect of piracy in two-
sided eBook market. They do not show, in the presence of piracy, which model ensures 
maximum benefit for publishers, platforms or other parties.  
3.3 Digital Piracy & Digital Right Management 
An abundance of literature has been published on pricing of information goods. Some of the 
authors incorporate piracy in their models. These papers mostly deal with impact of piracy on 
pricing, consumer behavior, how to combat with piracy problem and government policies.  In 
their survey paper, Peitz & Waelbroeck (2006) state that digital products can be copied at 
most no cost and are subject to non-commercial copying by final consumers. Bae & Choi 
(2006) analyze the short-run effects of piracy on software usage and the long-run effects on 
development incentives. They consider reproduction cost and degradation cost of piracy. 
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They find that reproduction cost is constant across users, but, degradation cost is proportional 
to consumers’ valuation of the original product.   However, in our model, we assume 
consumers’ cost of piracy varies according to the investment in DRM by platform under 
resale model and publisher under the agency model. Consumers may engage in piracy for 
many reasons, including economic, legal, ethical, network, and behavioral aspects (Coyle et 
al. 2009). However, attitudes towards original vs. pirated products vary from consumer to 
consumer. Khouja & Park (2008) consider a heterogeneous consumer market with different 
segments and show each segment has a different affinity to piracy. Mussa & Rosen (1978) 
developed a model of vertical product differentiation to investigate the effects of digital 
piracy. They stated that consumers have a demand and make the choice between the original 
and the copy, dependent upon their willingness to pay for the product. Belleflame (2002), 
Yoon (2002), and Bae and Choi (2006) also utilize this view of consumers, and state that a 
consumer obtains utility from purchasing an original. In our model, we assume that 
consumers’ preference varies between pirated and original eBooks. We also assume that 
consumers will pay more for an original eBook, because they get more utility from it. 
Some literature argued that piracy is not harmful at all if it provides product 
information to consumers (Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2003), if it reduces price competition (Gu & 
Mahajan, 2004) or if it helps to develop an initial user base that can be monopolized later 
(Prasad & Mahajan, 2003). However, King & Lampe (2003) show that allowing piracy 
cannot raise profit if the monopoly producers can directly price discriminate between 
potential pirates and other customers. Piracy always results in opportunity loss, its adverse 
effect on profits needs to be incorporated in strategic decisions such as pricing (Nascimento 
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& Vanhonacker, 1988). Varian (2005) and Nascimento & Vanhonacker (1988) consider the 
presence of coping when they develop pricing strategies for reproducible consumer goods. 
However, they do not consider two-sided market situation, which is more applicable for 
today’s digital products. Rasch & Wenzel (2013) consider the impact of software piracy in a 
two-sided market setting and show equilibrium price structure is affected by piracy. They 
show that in the presence of piracy, incompatible platform provides more software protection 
by raising license fee for developers. This effect decreases software developer’s profit and 
increases platform’s profit. However, they do not consider the agency perspective of pricing. 
In our model we assume that piracy always creates losses for publisher and marketplace.  
Literature shows different ways to combat with piracy. For example, Khouja & 
Rajagopalan (2009) show how a two-price strategy and dual distribution channels may help 
in reducing the negative effects of piracy. They conclude that two-price strategy is successful 
when impending price increase causes consumers to buy a product early ; and dual 
distribution strategy is successful when market is segmented in two parts and the second 
channel takes advantage of information technology to enable quick product distribution at 
low cost.  Khouja & Wang (2010) examine the impact of a digital channel for experience 
goods on piracy and find that consumers’ access to the digital channel reduces piracy in both 
digital and dual-channel distribution. They find that dual channel suffers least from piracy 
because it allows retail captive consumers to still legally obtain the product.  Chellappa & 
Shivendu (2005) develop a pricing model for digital experience goods in a segmented market 
and finds the optimality of sampling as a piracy-mitigating strategy. Chen & Png (2003) 
consider how the government should set the fine for copying, tax on copying medium, and 
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subsidy on legitimate purchases, whereas a monopoly publisher sets price and spending on 
detection. They conclude that society prefers the publisher to manage piracy by lower price 
than increased enforcement of other strategies. However, in this paper we are interested in 
Digital Right Management (DRM) as a piracy protection mechanism. 
According to Ahn & Shin (2010), DRM refers to technologies designed to control 
how end-users can access, copy, convert, or convert digital products, such as software, 
music, movies and books. The role of DRM is to protect and manage digital information or 
intellectual property ownership as contents travels through the value chain from the content 
creators to consumers and even from consumers to consumers (Fetscherin, 2002). Different 
authors (Park & Scotchmer, 2005; Li & Lin, 2009; Choi et al, 2010; Ahn & Shin, 2010) 
consider the impact of DRM with other strategies. Sundararajan (2004) analyze the optimal 
choice of pricing schedules and technological deterrence levels in a market with digital 
piracy where sellers can influence the degree of piracy by implementing digital rights 
management systems. DRM may work as substitute or complement with strong copyright 
enforcement by government. For example, Choi et al. (2010) show that DRM works better if 
it complements copy protection by government. Ahn & Shin (2010) presents a framework 
that helps to find out the optimal level of DRM and price. They show that stronger copyright 
enforcement reduces the inefficient usage of DRM.  
DRM restricts consumers’ piracy behavior; however it reduces flexibility of usage of 
the digital content that adversely impacts on legal users (Li & Lin, 2009; Choi et al, 2010; 
Sinha et al. 2010;  Ahn & Shin, 2010; Vernik et al. 2011; Sudler, 2013 ). Even DRM may 
stimulate piracy. Oestreicher-Singer & Sundararajan (2004) show the impact of DRM on 
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digital piracy. They find that granting certain rights may increase the availability of pirated 
substitutes. For example, right to print of eBook may enable the creation of illegal Pdf 
version of that book. Therefore, they suggest appropriate choice of digital rights, which 
depends on many technological and business factors. DRM increases cost of management 
and fails to prevent piracy (Sudler, 2013). Based on empirical studies, Sinha et al. (2010) 
conclude that DRM free environment enhances both consumer and producer welfare by 
increasing the demand for legal products and consumers’ willingness to pay for that product. 
Removing DRM helps to convert some pirates to paying consumers. DRM can be assigned 
by content provider (Li & Lin, 2009; Park & Scotchmer, 2005) or platform (Choi et al, 2010; 
Ahn & Shin, 2010). Park & Scotchmer (2005) show that effect of DRM on price depends on 
whether content provider applies DRM independently or shared with platform. In our model, 
we assume that the party who sets retail price, also responsible for cost of DRM. In the 
agency model, publisher invests in DRM; whereas, in the resale model, marketplace invests 
in DRM. 
Li and Lin (2009) argue that DRM protection level decreases and pirating activities 
becomes relatively tolerable as the content provider and platform provider operate 
collaboratively. Sinha et al. (2010) argue that the music industry can benefit from removing 
DRM because such a strategy has the potential to convert some pirates into paying 
consumers. In addition, a DRM-free environment enhances both consumer and producer 
welfare by increasing the demand for legitimate products as well as consumers’ willingness 
to pay for those products. However, a protection mechanism does not always protect piracy 
and is not always good for society. Kogan et al. (2013) present a model for a monopolistic 
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company offering software which is updated periodically, but, by the end of one period, a 
pirated version is always available at a transaction cost regardless of how tough the product’s 
protection measures are. Lahiri and Dey (2013) show that in certain situation, monopolist’s 
incentive to invest in quality of information goods in increased by lower piracy protection. 
They show that increases in detection affect welfare more negatively than price cuts. In our 
model, we assume that DRM protects piracy behavior of consumers. 
Given this theoretical framework, this thesis analyzes the impact of digital piracy on 
pricing strategy of eBook under the agency and resale models in monopoly market 
perspective. To serve this objective, first, we develop a benchmark model and show in the 
absence of piracy, which model, agency or resale, is better for publisher and for marketplace. 
Then, we will investigate, under the presence of piracy which model best serve the interest of 
publisher and of marketplace. We, then, show comparison between benchmark model and 
piracy model. We conclude this paper by discussing about possible extensions of our model.  
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Chapter 4: Model Specification 
In this study, as we mentioned earlier, we compare agency vs. resale models of pricing in 
two-sided market under the presence of piracy. We assume a monopoly publisher sells eBook 
to consumers through a monopoly platform. Under the agency model, a publisher makes a 
pricing decision and pays a share of revenue             to the platform as a per unit fee 
for having access to consumers (Gans, 2012; Johnson, 2013a, 2013b; Abhishek et al. 2013; 
Foros et al., 2013; and  Hagui & Wright, 2013). Under the resale model, platform makes a 
pricing decision and pays wholesale price,  to the publisher. We denote the agency model 
as a superscript   and the resale model as a superscript  . Subscripts   indicates publisher 
and  indicates platform marketplace.  
4.1 Consumer Demand  
Consumers have three options regarding the purchase decision of an eBook: buy an original 
eBook, obtain a pirated eBook, or do not buy anything. We assume that consumers already 
have access to the marketplace through devices such as Kindle, iPad, Kobo etc. The utility 
from buying an original eBook is         
   where     is the quality of an original 
(“best”) eBook,    [   ]  is consumer’s preference or willingness to pay parameter, and 
   is price of an eBook under                Consumers are heterogeneous and   is 
uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. The utility from a pirated eBook is         ( 
 ), 
where    is the quality of a pirated (“copied”) eBook and  ( 
 ) represents consumer’s cost of 
pirating ebook when a publisher or a platform invests DRM cost   to prevent piracy. We 
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assume         and         . A consumer’s utility is zero if he does not obtain an 
eBook.  
A marginal consumer is indifferent to purchasing an original eBook      and a 
pirated eBooks     .  The preference parameter of the marginal consumer    is defined as 
                          
       ( 
 )                            
   
    (  )
 
 
where,           Similarly, the preference parameter    of a marginal consumer who is  
indifferent to a pirated ebook      and no eBook buying/pirating      is defined as  
     ( 
 )    
   
 (  )
  
 
Given a uniformed distributed parameter of  , the demand for an original eBook is    
          
      (  )
 
 
4.2 Agency model 
Under the agency model, the publisher sets the retail price of eBook. To prevent piracy, (s)he 
also needs to invest   in DRM to protect his product from piracy. A publisher’s objective is 
to maximize his/her profit by determining the optimal level of    and   . 
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The publisher keeps only (1 - ) of the revenue, leaving the rest to a platform. We assume, 
value of   is exogenously given. The platform is simply a recipient of revenue from the 
publisher in this model. The profit of a platform marketplace is expressed as 
   
        
4.3 Resale model 
Under the resale model, the marketplace, not the publisher, makes a pricing and DRM 
investment decision. The profit maximizing decision of a marketplace is 
   
 
      
                
where w is the wholesale price of eBook. The publisher sets the wholesale price w of eBook 
to maximize his profit: 
  
 
 
        
4.4 Benchmark Model with No Piracy 
As a benchmark case, we consider a situation without any piracy by consumers. Consumers 
either purchase an original eBook or do not purchase anything. The preference of a marginal 
consumer is defined as   
  
 
, where s is the quality of an original eBook. The demand for 
eBook is        
    
 
 . 
4.4.1 Agency model  
The publisher maximizes the profit by deciding the retail price  
   
 
  
                      (
    
 
) 
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From the first order condition, we can determine the equilibrium price and quantity of eBook 
as                                                                            
 
 
                                                  
                                                          
 
 
                                                  
Then, the equilibrium profits of publisher and platform are, respectively, 
                                                    
  
      
 
                                         
                                                     
  
  
 
                                                   
From the above outcomes, we see that how much profit the marketplace will make depends 
only on the percentage of revenue share    . However, as publisher is the price maker, his 
profit varies according to quality of his product and percentage of revenue share.  
4.4.2 Resale model 
Under the resale model, the marketplace sets the retail price of an eBook. 
   
 
  
                    (
    
 
) 
From the first order condition, we can derive the price of and quantity of eBook as  
   
   
 
                
   
  
 
The publisher sets the wholesale price   to maximize his profit 
   
 
 
      (
   
  
) 
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The equilibrium wholesale price is  
  
 
 
 
Thus, the price and demand for eBook at the equilibrium price are, respectively 
                                                      
  
 
                                              
                                                     
 
 
                                                
The profits of publisher and platform are, respectively, 
                                                   
  
 
 
                                               
                                                    
  
 
  
                                           
4.4.3 Discussion of the benchmark case 
In the benchmark case, price is higher under the resale model than under the agency 
model [                             ]. Under the resale model, publisher sets wholesale 
price. Platform pays wholesale price to the publisher and sets retail price. Platform mark-ups 
the retail price on the basis of the wholesale price. Therefore, in resale model, price set-up is 
a two steps process, which leads to higher price than price in agency model. This finding is 
consistent with the observation of Gans (2013), who find that double marginalization 
problem is the cause of higher wholesale price. Our result also matches with the finding of 
Johnson (2013a), who shows that retail prices are higher under the wholesale model due to 
the two layers of the supply chain. However, our result is different from the finding of 
Johnson (2013b), who conducted two-period analysis in a bilateral oligopoly situation and 
shows that price is initially goes up as a result of adoption of agency model, because retailer 
  27 
and consumers value consumer lock-in very differently. In the first period supplier has no 
incentive to reduce price, however, locking-in consumer in the first period is valuable to 
retailer to monopolize in the second period. Johnson (2013b) also shows that second period 
prices are lower under the agency model due to competition in the supplier side. However, 
we do not consider two-period, effect of ‘lock-in’ and competition in our benchmark model.  
Table 4-1 Summary of Benchmark Model 
                 Agency Comparison                     Resale 
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The percentage of revenue share     determines the profit variations between 
publisher and marketplace under the both models. If the value of   is less than 0.5, agency 
model is better for the publisher than resale model, because publisher earns more profit under 
this condition [                             ]  Again, if the   is greater than 0.25, agency 
model is better than resale model for the marketplace [                             ]. Our 
intuition is that if the monopoly marketplace tries to raise the value of    to maximize its 
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revenue from eBook, the publisher will set lower price to maximize its profit and vice versa. 
However, our observation might be complicated if publisher and marketplace face 
competition. 
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Chapter 5: Effects of Piracy 
5.1 Agency Model 
When the agency model is in work, the publisher sets the price of eBook and the amount of 
DRM to maximize the profit. 
   
 
      
                               (
          
 
) 
From the first order conditions, the price of eBook under the agency model is derived as 
                       
          
 
                                                                 
The amount of DRM investment     is the solution of the following equation. 
                      (        )                                              
Without a functional form of     , we cannot explicitly solve for   . Using equation (9) and 
(10) in equilibrium, we can derive the following condition. 
          (          )                                                                
The demand for eBook is expressed as 
   
  
          
   
    
 
 
          
  
   
In order to have a positive demand for eBook, we should have the following relation from 
equation (11). 
                                                                                                                  
That is, the slope of the DRM cost function should be one at equilibrium (see Appendix 2 for 
details). 
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The profits of publisher and platform are, respectively, 
        
        
  
                                                                               
    
              
  
                                                                     
5.2 Resale Model 
When the resale model is in work, the marketplace sets the price of eBook and the amount of 
DRM. 
   
 
      
                         (
          
 
) 
From the first order condition, the price of eBook under the resale model is derived as 
   
            
 
                                                                               
The amount of DRM investment should satisfy the following equation. 
          (            )                                                        
The demand for the eBook under the resale model should be positive and we have the 
following relation from equation (16). 
                                                                                                                   
Based on the equations (12) and (17), the equilibrium investment of DRM is the same under 
both models. 
The publisher sets the wholesale price of eBook. 
  
 
 
         (
            
  
) 
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From the first order condition, we derive the wholesale price  
  
          
 
                                                  
Putting the value of   in equation (15) and in    we get price and demand of eBook under 
the resale model  
        
            
 
                                           
   
          
  
                                                 
The profits of publisher and platform are, respectively, 
   
        
  
                                                     
   
        
   
                                                     
5.3 Discussion on the Effect of Piracy 
In the presence of piracy, the retail price is higher under the resale model due to the 
same reason explained in the benchmark case. However, the size of price increase is higher 
in the agency model[                         ]. If the investment in DRM increases, 
after a certain level, price will be same under the both models. The intuition behind this 
phenomenon is straightforward: under the agency model, only publisher bears the DRM cost. 
Publisher, then, recovers this cost by charging higher price on consumer. Under the resale 
model, publisher sets the wholesale price and marketplace sets the retail price. Marketplace 
invests in DRM to protect piracy. Marketplace recovers DRM cost in two ways: (i) Paying 
lower wholesale price to the publisher; the publisher may set lower wholesale price in the 
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presence of DRM believing that DRM will create more demand, and (ii) incorporating 
portion of DRM cost in retail price. Therefore, marketplace has two ways to recoup the DRM 
cost. However, publisher does not have such option and, as a result, charges relatively more 
on the consumer under the resale model in the presence of piracy. Consumer’s cost of 
pirating eBook varies according to the DRM investment of the price maker. We find that cost 
of DRM is same under the both models [                          ] , because 
consumer’s piracy behavior does not relate to the pricing model adopted by the industry.  
Table 5-1 Summary of Piracy Model 
 Agency Comparison Resale 
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> (     ≥.11) 
< (   <.11) 
        
   
 
 
We find that the wholesale price reduces [                 ] in the presence of 
DRM investment which means that with higher piracy protection, publisher charges lower 
wholesale price under the resale model. We can explain this observation in the following 
  33 
way. Higher piracy protection reduces the consumer’s piracy behavior and, eventually, 
increases the demand of original eBook. Alternatively, we can say that invest in DRM 
reduces the publisher’s opportunity loss due to piracy. Marketplace is aware about this 
impact of DRM and, then, bargains with the publisher to set relatively lower wholesale price. 
Publisher, then, observe the market demand, which is higher under resale model, and reduces 
wholesale price. 
Demand for original eBook reduces at a higher rate with the increasing amount of 
DRM investment under the agency model than that of resale model, because price is 
increasing at a higher rate in agency model than that of resale model due to the reason 
explained above. In this case, publisher earns more profit if revenue-share     is less than 0.5 
[                         ]. If       , resale model is beneficial for the publisher. The 
marketplace earns more profit under the agency model than that of resale model if      
[                         ]. 
5.4 Comparison: Benchmark and Piracy Scenarios 
In general price is higher under the both models in the presence of piracy than the price of 
benchmark scenario, because in the presence of piracy either publisher in the agency model 
or marketplace in the resale model invests in DRM to protect piracy, which, then, increases 
the cost that increases retail price. 
           We find that retail price is higher under the resale model in the both scenarios due to 
the double marginalization problem. However, further investment in piracy protection will 
increase the retail price under agency model, because only publisher bears the DRM cost. 
Publisher, then, recovers this cost by charging higher price on consumer. Under the resale 
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model, marketplace invests in DRM. Marketplace recovers this cost in two ways: paying 
lower wholesale price to the publisher and charging more on consumers.  
           In the benchmark scenario, demand for original product is higher under the agency 
model due to the lower price than that of resale model. However, in the presence of piracy, 
demand for original product reduces with the higher rate of price increase due to increasing 
investment on DRM under the agency model than the demand under resale model. 
           Wholesale price is higher in the benchmark case; however, it is lower in the piracy 
case due to the DRM investment by the marketplace. DRM investment increases cost. To 
recoup part of the cost, marketplace pays relatively lower wholesale price to the publisher. 
           Consumer’s cost of pirating eBook increases with the increasing investment on DRM 
by publisher or marketplace to prevent piracy. However, consumer’s cost of pirating eBook 
is same under the both models, because consumer behaves in the same way under whatever 
model employed by the industry.  
           Piracy affects aversely on the profits of publisher and marketplace. However, amount 
of profits vary according to the share of revenue    . In the presence of piracy, publisher’s 
profit will be higher under the agency model than that of resale model if share of   is less 
than 0.5. This observation is similar to the finding of benchmark case, where publisher earns 
more profit under the agency model than that of resale model if the value of   is less than 
0.5. Marketplace makes more profit under the agency model than that of resale model in the 
presence of piracy if the value of   is more than 0.11. However, in the benchmark case, 
marketplace earns more profit if the value of   is more than 0.25. Therefore, under the 
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piracy, publisher has less flexibility in price setting than that of marketplace due the less 
choice on revenue share. Furthermore, as we explain earlier, publisher cannot share his DRM 
cost with other. However, Marketplace shares part of the DRM with the publisher by paying 
reactively lower wholesale price. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
          In this paper, we analyze the effects of piracy on retail prices of eBooks under the 
agency and resale models in monopoly market perspective. We setup agency and resale 
models under benchmark and piracy scenarios and compare them. The comparison between 
benchmark and piracy scenarios shows that in general price is higher under both models in 
the presence of piracy than the price of the benchmark scenario. We find that retail price is 
higher under the resale model in both scenarios due to the double marginalization problem 
(Gans, 2013). However, further investment in piracy protection will increase the retail price 
under the agency model, because only the publisher bears the DRM cost.  In the benchmark 
scenario, demand for original product is higher under the agency model due to the lower 
price than that of resale model. However, in the presence of piracy, demand for original 
product reduces with the higher rate of price increase due to increasing investment on DRM 
under the agency model than the demand under resale model. Wholesale price is higher in the 
benchmark case; however, it is lower in the piracy case due to the DRM investment by the 
marketplace. We find that investment in DRM is same in both models, because a consumer 
behaves in the same way under whatever model employed by the industry. Piracy affects 
aversely on the profits of publisher and marketplace. However, amount of profits for 
publisher and marketplace vary according to the share of revenue   In the presence of piracy, 
publisher has less flexibility in price setting than that of marketplace due the less choice on 
revenue share.  This paper suggests that, in the presence of piracy, the agency model may not 
be a better strategy for the publisher if the market structure is monopoly; resale model may 
be better for the publisher in this situation. 
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          Our paper fills the gap of existing literature by incorporating piracy in a two-sided 
market and shows which model, agency vs. resale, is helpful for publishers and the 
marketplace in the presence of piracy. We hope this paper is a good starting point to think 
about digital piracy in two-sided market context. In this paper we consider monopoly 
publisher and monopoly marketplace. However, in real world there exist multiple publishers 
and multiple platforms. One possible extension of our model is to introduce competition in 
our piracy model. Another possible extension may be inclusion of device in our model that 
may be more realistic in today’s world. One can further extend the model by changing two 
important variables in the existing model: wholesale price and cost of DRM. Currently, 
wholesale price is set by the publisher and DRM cost is set by the party who is responsible 
for setting retail price. However, if anyone changes the model where wholesale price set by 
the platform and DRM cost always by the publisher, (s) he will get different result. Finally, 
one may even remove DRM and include the impact of government’s IPR regulations in our 
model and solve for equilibrium price for publisher and marketplace. 
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Appendix 1 
Notations 
               Agency model 
               Resale model 
             Publisher 
            Platform marketplace 
             An original eBook 
             A pirated eBook 
     Utility from buying an original eBook 
    Utility from buying a pirated eBook 
    Quality of an original eBook 
    Quality of a pirated eBook 
   Quality difference between original and pirated eBooks 
   Consumer’s preference or willingness to pay,   [   ] 
   Revenue share,   [   ] 
    Price of eBook under              
    Demand of eBook under              
    Wholesale price 
    Cost of DRM 
       Consumer’s cost of pirating an eBook when publisher or platform invest DRM cost   to 
protect piracy 
  
   Profit of publisher under agency model 
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   Profit of platform under agency model 
  
   Profit of publishers under resale model 
  
    Profit of platform under resale model 
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Appendix 2 
The slope of DRM cost function at equilibrium 
In the agency model, the publisher’s profit function is: 
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The first order conditions are, respectively 
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The price of eBook under the agency model is 
                       
          
 
                                                                 
The amount of DRM investment     is the solution of the following equation. 
                      (        )                                              
Without an explicit functional form of     , we cannot explicitly solve for   . Using 
equation (i) and (ii) in equilibrium, we can derive the following condition. 
(        ) (
          
 
)                                      
          (          )                                                                
The demand for eBook is expressed as 
   
  
          
   
    
 
 
          
  
   
In order to have a positive demand for eBook, we should have the following relation from 
equation (iii). 
                                                                                                                
That is, the slope of DRM cost function should be one at equilibrium. 
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In the resale model is in work, the marketplace sets the price of eBook and the amount of 
DRM. 
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The first order conditions are, respectively 
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The price of eBook under the resale model is 
   
            
 
                                                                              
The amount of DRM investment is the solution of the following equation. 
(        )                                                        
Using equation (v) and (vi) in equilibrium, we can derive the following condition. 
(        ) (
            
 
)                           
          (            )                                                         
The demand for the eBook under the resale model is expressed as 
 
   
  
            
   
    
 
 
            
  
   
 
Again, in order to have a positive demand for eBook, we should have the following relation 
from equation (vii). 
                                                                                                                                
Based on the equations (iv) and (viii), the equilibrium investment of DRM is the same under 
both models. 
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